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Abstract
In this article, first of all, I (Hereafter: the writer)1 will concur counterexample
objection against divine command theory and present New Humanism as an
example of it. In addition, the writer will argue if one imagine none of abjections - for
example the counterexample objection- does not work against divine command
theory, and then, a theocratic government applies divine command theory, thus, the
theocracy will struggle in a problem that the writer calls inapplicability problem.2
Counterexample Objection to Divine Command Theory
To begin with, the writer concurs the counterexample objection against divine
command theory (Hereafter: CODC) among many other objections that is to be a
moral person and to have a meaningful and moral life it does not necessary to track
divine command theory (Hereafter: DC).3
1 Ph.D. Student of Philosophy of Religion at IHCS, Email: lotfiyazdi@gmail.com
The writer's footnote: The writer's footnote: "Be a Good Person, Not That Theocratic Way" is an
early draft and a chapter of the writer's prospective Ph.D. thesis that is "Philosophy of Theocracy"
and so, please do not cite without the writer's permission. Also, it is not only that the suggestions
are welcome, but also, the writer will be indebted to you if you invite this paper to your peer-review
journal. The last but not least, the next versions of this paper will be both proofread and more
developed in next months.
2 The writer's footnote: The writer has applied his permanent methodology to this work.
3 For objections against DC, see: (Boyd & VanArragon, 2004, pp. 301-2) , (Idziak, 2010, pp. 589-90) ,
CODC (Metz, 2021).
The writer has chosen DC as a version of Theological Volunteerism and so, the writer knows the
other types of it as a replaceable with DC.
II
To prove the CODC, the writer will consider New Humanism4 as an example of
CODC. Besides that, significantly the writer follows this idea that there is no
possibility to claim that:
X= a humanist
- X claims that he is a humanist,
- But, X does not believe that he ought to satisfy ethical life,
- It seems that it is rationally impossible,
- Because to fulfilling a humanist life or to be a New Humanist, X has
to follow ethical life,
- However, you could be a freethinker, atheist, agnostic and so many
others without ethical life, but you could not be a humanist without
satisfying ethical life.5
What's more. the writer has to expand the New humanism example of CODC as a
problem of DC:
X= one who is new humanist,
Y= one who is not new humanist and is theistic,
Ѱ= life is meaningful and morals,
Φ= life is meaningless and amoral,
 A.
• Reasons of Y to Ѱ is that:
• 1. You need some theistic arguments during your life to has Ѱ,
• 2. Or, you need some theistic arguments to defeat death as enemy of
immortality to has Ѱ or to defeat devil as enemy of immorality and
amorality or to defeat that you have to be someone like Y,
• But, X argues to have Ѱ,
• 3. You do not need to follow (1), Because, you have a life now and
the valuable and meaning of life is in life and it is not outside of life,
4 For New Humanism, see: 1. General approaches of New Humanism (Lamont, 1997) , (Norman,
2004) , (Wielenberg, 2005) , 2. Metaphysics of New Humanism (Dacey, 2003, pp. 138-9) , (Lamont,
1997, p. 248) , causal closure of New Humanism (Lamont, 1997:236), (Norman, 2004:28), (Vaughn
2006:69), 3. Epistemology of New Humanism (Vaughn, 2003, pp. 107-11) , (Norman, 2004, p. 28) ,
(Lamont, 1997, p. 236) , 4. Value Theory of New Humanism: meaning of life (Wielenberg, 2005, pp.
152-60) (Lamont, 1997, p. xxv) , (Norman, 2004, pp. 18,113) , Aesthetics (Norman, 2004, p. 142) ,
Ethics (Norman, 2004, p. 106) , (Lamont, 1997, pp. 30-2, 248) , (Vaughn, 2003, pp. 88, 93-6) ,
(Norman, 2004, pp. 132-59) , Political Philosophy (Dacey, 2003, p. 214) , (Lamont, 1997, pp. 256-
7,325), 5. Comparison of New Humanism (Dacey, 2003, p. 45) , (Lamont, 1997, pp. xviii,31) , (Dacey,
2003, p. 45) , 6. Problems of New Humanism (Dacey, 2003, pp. 138-9) , 7. Replies against CODC: 1.
The Outcome Reply (Wielenberg, 2005, p. 16) , reply to reply (Wielenberg, 2005, p. 29) , 2. The
Pointless Existence Reply (Wielenberg, 2005, p. 17) , reply to reply (Metz, 2021) , 3. The Nobody of
Significance Cares Reply (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 17-8), reply to reply (Wielenberg, 2005, p. 19), 4. God
as the Source of Ethics Reply (Wielenberg, 2005, p. 18), reply to reply (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 38-67),
Wielenberg's Humanist Reply (Wielenberg, 2005, p. 152) , reply to reply (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 152-
60).
5 For proving this idea, see: (Vaughn, 2003, pp. 85-114) , (Norman, 2004, p. 18) , (Lamont, 1997, pp.
276-7,322-3)
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also, it does not matter Y's arguments of (1), since, they need to be
some arguments in life, altogether, it shows that those arguments
could be independent from (1),
• 4. Also, you do not need to follow (2), Since, you could fulfill your
life and has Ѱ, even though, you know that you will die forever, or
you could not fulfill your life and has not Ѱ, even though, you know
that you will live forever. It shows that those arguments could be
independent from 2.
 B.
• But, one may object that one has to be Y to has Ѱ, if she does not to
be Y, that makes Ѱ to be Φ,
• She admits that A.,
• But, she argues that Y only has Ѱ,
• And, she argues that X only has Φ,
• Y owns Ѱ, due to the fact that Ѱ is naturally belongs one like Y.,
• X owns Φ, due to the fact that Φ is naturally belongs one like X.,
• As a result, Ѱ is identical to Y's life,
• As second result, Φ is identical to X's life,
• Although, one may argue that all of Ѱ is not identical to Y's life,
because Y's life something and Ѱ is something else,
• Owing to fact that Ѱ includes some other meaningful phenomena
that some of them are subjective like hobbies and some others are
objective like theistic purposes (if Ѱ includes Y's one) or moral
values,
• So, as matter of fact, you ought to make and/or grasp Ѱ,
• And avoid to Φ,
• Thus, it does not matter that Y is better that X, since, you always
have Φ if you fulfill your life,
• And, it does not matter that X is better that Y, since, you always
have Φ if you fulfill your life.
 That means that one may, due to this or that reason, says that we have to
adopt the theistic view. Next, it seems that, everyone has to fulfill her life,
follow her meaningful hobbies, obey the moral laws, create the fine arts, make
a relationship with others, do non-profit and voluntary services, be a good
person and so many others, and all of these are inherently and significantly
independent from theistic beliefs. Thus, all of those activities and attitudes
have been making human life as meaningful, objectively and/or subjectively.
Also, we oughtn't to waste our life and wait to check whether there is
supernatural being in the world or check whether there is not supernatural
being in the world and so, we could make and/or grasp the meaning of life
here and now. That means you could be a theistic person but you ought to be
moral person or you could be an atheist but you ought to be moral person. You
have to make life meaningful and fulfill your life, make some purposes in your
life that is one more time is free of theistic lifestyle, ontologically. Beside that
IV
death may or may not finish your life and so, there is may or may not
immortality, but, if you love your child because you ought to do your duties
and you have to follow your instinct and you have passed the special way for
him/her. This is naturally different from the view point that death undermine
your life and the life is meaningless or death disappears everything. It seems
that A. and B. is showing that the morality and meaning in life is not only
independent from theistic belief, but also, it shows that one could have
fulfilling life with moral and other valuable entities.
Divine Command Theory in Theocracy
The proportion of the writer to the problem is in this section and so, let reject the
concurrent claim and presuppose DC. The writer would argue that precisely Divine
Command Theory in Theocracy (Hereafter: DCT) is not only suffers from main
mistakes of DCT in individual moral sense, but also, DCT proposes another
mainstream that is inapplicability of DCT (Hereafter: IDCT). Let the writer survives
the differentials of DCT:
Z= A theocracy that spins DCT,
Y= Citizens of Z,
Φ = Participating in DCT,
Ѱ= Believing in DCT.
 Presupposition A: Imagine Y & Φ,
 Presupposition B: Imagine A & Ѱ.
 Presupposition C: Imagine B & IDCT.
The writer thinks C is coming from those objections whose based on the public
sphere that means all of those objections have to affect or relate to Y's the public
sphere, even though, it is clear that they have to remain individual. The writer also
claims C contains of a cluster of reciprocal objections.
First of all, if a theocracy very strongly and successfully enrolls DCT, then it appears
that Y will be grateful of Z, and in this case, no one will be claims of C.
However, if Z do not and/or could not enroll A & B strongly and successfully, then it
seems that C will be presented. As a consequence, Y could be doubtful whether they
have to A & B. It is due to the fact that Y believe if Φ and Ѱ and IDCT arises, then C
will be harmful to DC. Y may think it would be better if Y place and draw DC as
individualistically.
Another solution would be that Y thinks another DCT has to be applied to avoid of
IDCT. Although, what if the new DCT transfer to IDCT as mentioned before or what
would be that if one asks why we need to enforce DC to DCT when we know it is
possible we face IDCT and waste DC unnecessarily.
V
Besides that, imagine Y ignorantly chose wrongful DC and after a while they come up
with idea that they have to pick up another DC and runs it in as DCT. One more time,
they waste DC, since, they expand the wrongful DC to DCT publically and collectively.
Moreover, imagine Y follow the true DC, but, they have applied the wrongful DCT.
Undeniably, they will be struggling with a nonconsistency and wasting of DC as DCT.
Conclusion
The writer assumes two presuppositions of Divine Goodness and then argue that
there is a naturalistic problem to know that if God is Divine Goodness then DC is true.
The writer has concurred CODC by two examples that are New Humanism and
Mazadayasna. The last part of this work is devoted to problems of DCT.
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